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NOTES AND COMMENT
In the dissent, Cardozo, J., sounds the note of distinction between
such a rule and one which denies the exercise of the right to foreclose
and leaves open the treatment of cases with analogous circumstances.
It seems that a better rule would be the one suggested by Cardozo, J.
Not only would it have accomplished substantial justice in the instant
case but it, as well, would allow for a better analysis of future prob-
lems unhampered by a precedent of "certainty of obligation." The
fear of the Court in the majority opinion that another conclusion
would affect this "certainty" is unfounded. The general rule, oft
enunciated, still retains its force. There is a limit, however, beyond
which the rule serves no useful purpose and is not consonant with the
need intended for its application. The fostering of equitable doc-
trines and decrees in this jurisdiction is well recognized. And the
application of equitable principles in the instant case would have
advanced a more just as well as practical rule.
ALLEN K. BERGMAN.
LIABILITY OF TRUSTEES FOR RETENTION OF SPECULATIVE STOCKS.
Society, in its early stages, was devoid of the complicated rules
which, today, govern the ownership, use. and disposition of property.
Modernity, assailed as it has been by the intricacies of present-day
methods and the demands of constantly changing concepts, has taxed
jurisprudence to the limit by its plea that old law should not suffocate
new principles. The answer of the courts to this supplication is
admirably typified in the law of trusts.
With the popularity of corporate trustees established beyond per-
adventure of doubt, an exhaustive treatment of their duties and lia-
bilities by an authority is regarded as salutary. Such a treatment was
accorded a recent case by Surrogate Slater.' A comprehension of its
conclusions is interesting.
The action was brought to surcharge the trustee for the retention
of highly speculative securities, which had declined greatly in value.
Appointed as trustee under a clause in the will, permitting the trustee
to continue investments made by the testator, without personal liabil-
ity for so doing, the trust company qualified in March, 1923. For
seven years, the trustee, in spite of the fact that the stocks slowly, but
surely, were declining in value, continued to hold them. This it did
in the face of knowledge that such stocks were poor trust investments
-it having so advised others in a booklet, published for that purpose.
The objectors charged the trustee with negligence and a breach of
trust duty. The trustee sought protection under the permissive clause
in the will, and further attempted to defend its position by pleading
Matter of Clark, 136 Misc. 881, 242 N. Y. Supp. 210 (1930).
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advice of counsel and good faith. It was admitted at the trial that the
good faith of the trustee could not be impugned. Surrogate Slater,
considering the facts, held that the trustee should be surcharged for
negligence in continuing to hold said highly speculative and doubtful
securities, notwithstanding the permissive clause in the will. He felt
that such permission did not absolve a trustee from exercising the
ordinary prudence and diligence, sagacity and vigilance, commen-
surate with their legally required conduct.
A brief resum6 of the law applicable to trustees and their duties
is necessary to appreciate fully the import of such a decision. Legis-
lators and courts of equity in their zeal to protect the rights of a
beneficiary have circumscribed greatly a trustee's activity with trust
funds. In the initial instance, courts, realizing that an unrestricted
trustee was repugnant to the very essence of a trust arrangement,
prescribed a course of conduct, which, according to many authorities,
imposes upon the trustee a duty to employ such diligence, prudence,
sagacity, and vigilance in the care and management of an estate, as
prudent men of discretion employ in their own like affairs.2 This
exaction, coupled with the power of a court of equity to remove a
trustee by properly instigated proceedings for reasons which encom-
pass misconduct,3 breach of trust,4 and failure to invest as directed,5
acted as a deterrent to trustees, who, otherwise, might have been free
to dissipate negligently the trust corpus.
But abstract demands, such as diligence, prudence, and sagacity,
while efficacious to an extent, were, in the minds of our legislators,
relative terms, which frustrated in many instances equitable conclu-
sions. To serve as a panacea, the legislature decreed that trustees, in
the absence of a permissive and discretionary clause, were to be
precluded from investing trust funds in other than certain enumerated
securities. 6 These latter statutory inhibitions, however, in no way
affect a trustee, who acts under a permissive clause, which gives him
the privilege of using his discretion free from statutory restrictions. 7
It. is settled law that a testator may obviate, by an express permission,
the necessity for a trustee conforming to the above-mentioned legis-
lative fiats.8 As Judge Scott tersely phrased it in speaking for the
court in the Matter of Reid: 9
2King v. Talbot, 40 N. Y. 76 (1869); Matter of Hall, 164 N. Y. 196,
58 N. E. 11 (1900) ; Costello v. Costello, 209 N. Y. 252, 103 N. E. 148 (1913).3 In re McGilliuray, 138 N. Y. 308, 33 N. E. 1077 (1893).
'Haight v. Brisbin, 100 N. Y. 219, 3 N. E. 74 (1885).
'Cummings v. Williams, 193 App. Div. 596, 184 N. Y. Supp. 404 (3rd
Dept., 1920).
'New York Laws of 1909, ch. 18, sec. 111.
'Matter of Hall. supra Note 2; Matter of Chapman, 59 App. Div. 624
(1901), aff'd 167 N. Y. 619, 60 N. E. 1118 (1901); Matter of Vom Saal, 82
Misc. 531, 145 N. Y. Supp. 307 (1913); Matter of Reid, 170 App. Div. 631,
156 N. Y. Supp. 500 (1st Dept., 1915).8 ibid.
'Matter of Reid, supra Note 7 at 634. 156 N. Y. Supp. at 502, 503.
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"It is fundamental law that a testator or the creator of a
trust has unlimited authority to direct how his money may be
invested by his trustees, or may leave the manner of such
investment completely in the discretion of such trustees."
In the absence of such directions and powers, the trustees must
be governed by the general rules of the court or by the statutes and
laws of the state in which the trust is to be executed. 0 In New York,
the courts have imposed on the trustee the affirmative duty of chang-
ing a so-called illegal trust investment as soon as practical, or as
frequently written, within a reasonable time."' What constitutes a
reasonable time is always a question of fact.1 2 So assiduously have
the courts applied themselves to the protection of the rights of a
ccstui que trust that a departure from lawful investments has wrought
heavy penalties on the trustee.13 If such a departure from the trust
prohibitions results in a profit, the cestwis que trust are entitled to such
profit; 14 if it proves improvident, the cestuis are entitled to interest
on the money; 'r and, if the investment has been made with funds of
the estate, mingled with funds of the trustee, in various stocks, and
the funds of the estate cannot be traced and identified in any particu-
lar stocks, the cestuis que trust are entitled to select those stocks which
they deem most desirable.' 6
With the foregoing decisions as a background, how, then, can
we justify Surrogate Slater's decision in the Clark case? Can we
hold the trustee liable for negligence in spite of the permissive feature
of the will and even though he was not to be personally liable? The
question is not devoid of complexities.
The primary duty of a trustee is to preserve the trust funds and
to procure a safe and just income therefrom.' 7 The burden of proof
is upon the party seeking to surcharge, to show negligence in failing
to sell.' 8 Advice of counsel, while pertinent to good faith, cannot
relieve the trustee from the results of his acts pursuant thereto. 9
Perry, in his monumental work on trusts, in speaking of a trustee's
duty in such a situation, writes:
30 Supra Note 6.
3 Matter of Myers, 131 N. Y. 409, 30 N. E. 135 (1892).
"Ketchum v. Stevens, 19 N. Y. 499 (1859).
"King v. Talbot, supra Note 2; Matter of Klein, 80 Misc. 377, 142 N. Y.
Supp. 557 (1913).
", Penman v. Slocum, 41 N. Y. 53 (1869); Adair v. Brimmer, 74 N. Y.
Supp. 539 (1878).
. Holden v. New York & Erie Bank, 72 N. Y. 286 (1878); In re Nesmith,
140 N. Y. 609, 35 N. E. 942 (1894).
" King v. Talbot, su~pra Note 2.
"'King v. Talbot, Matter of Hall, Costello v. Costello, all supra Note 2;
Villard v. Villard. 219 N. Y. 482, 114 N. E. 789 (1916).
'Matter of Wagner, 40 Misc. 490, 82 N. Y. Supp. 797 (1903).
"Matter of Belcher, 129 Misc. 218 221 N. Y. Supp. 711 (1927) and cases
cited; Matter of Demmerle, 130 Misc. 684, 225 N. Y. Supp. 190 (1927).
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"If a testator gives any directions in his will to continue
his investments already made, trustees must of course follow
such directions; and if they follow them in good faith, they
will not be liable for any losses, unless they are negligent infailing to change an investment when it ought to be changed
to save it; for it cannot be supposed that the direction of a
testator to continue a certain investment relieves the trustees
from the ordinary duty of watching such investments, and of
calling it in when there is imminent danger of its loss by a
change of circumstances." (Italics ours.) 20
The learned author cites no precedents-apparently content to rest on
the persuasive logic of such an exaction.
Yet, the instant case is not entirely without precedent, albeit
analogical. In Matter of Hurlbut, 2 1 the will of the testator authorized
the executor to invest in other than legally authorized securities. Pur-
suant to such authorization, the executor made an investment in bonds
of a steamship corporation, which, a short time thereafter, became
insolvent. In an action brought to surcharge the executor with such
losses, the Appellate Division unanimously affirmed the decision ren-
dered by Surrogate Patterson on the opinion of the Surrogate, which
had held the executor liable. The Surrogate, in speaking of an
executor's duty under such circumstances, wrote:
"I think it is conceded that where such a clause is found
clothing a trustee with discretion he is answerable only when he
has not acted in good faith and used the care and diligence in
investments which would be exercised by a reasonably careful
and prudent person." (Italics ours.)
Similarly, in Matter of Hall 2 2-though the facts are not analogous-
the Court succinctly stated the test to be applied in these words:
"The range of so-called 'legal securities' for the invest-
ment of trust funds is so narrow in this state that a testator
may well be disposed to grant to his executors or trustees
greater liberty in placing the funds of the estate. But such a
discretion in the absence of words in the will giving greater
authority should not be held to authorize investments of the
fund in new speculative or hazardous ventures." (Italics ours.)
It is true that these cases speak of the degree of care demanded from
a trustee when employing discretion in the investment of funds, as
distinguishd from a trustee who retains and holds with permission,
' Perry, Trusts (1910), sec. 465.
210 App. Div. 456, 206 N. Y. Supp. 448 (2nd Dept., 1924).
'Supra Note 2 at 199, 58 N. E. at 11.
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securities of the testator. But the test to be applied in both instances
is perforce identical. It would be an absurdity of the law to demand
in one instance prudence and sagacity in investing, and in another
solely extract indifference in maintaining the securities.
Such a view was given added forcefulness in an opinion written
by Chief Judge Cardozo. 23 Speaking of a trustee's duties in a case
wherein the latitude given the trustee surpassed the permission ex-
tended the instant trustee, Judge Cardozo said:
"It is true that the creator of this trust had reserved to
himself the broadest rights of management. His discretion
was to be 'absolute and uncontrolled.' That does not mean,
however, that it might be recklessly or wilfully abused. He
had made himself a trustee; and in so doing he had subjected
himself to those obligations of fidelity and diligence that attach
to the office of a trustee. * * * His discretion, however broad,
did not relieve him from obedience to the great principles of
equity which are the life of every trust."
The wisdom of such a conclusion is amplified by new features.
It has never been incumbent on a trustee to retain, under a permissive
clause in the will, the sedurities of the testator till the trust by its
terms expires.24 Courts have frequently upheld the trustee's right to
sell securities, even though the trust by its terms permits the retention
of unauthorized securities.25 In a well-considered opinion by Surro-
gate O'Brien,26 the learned Surrogate absolved a trustee from liabil-
ity for selling securities which the will allowed him to retain, and
overruled the objection of the beneficiary that the stocks had been
prematurely sold. The sum and substance of his reasoning was that it
was better to sell out stock too soon than too late. To quote him:
"The trustees had before them on the one side the knowl-
edge of the restrictions to so-called legal investments, con-
trolling the action of trustees lacking testamentary freedom of
discretion, and on the other side authority to continue the
investment in said stock, and even with this authority and dis-
cretion they were always in danger of being surcharged for
losses sustained. The trustees stood between these two ex-
tremes. Should they be penalized for having resisted the temp-
tation embodied in the power given by the will to seek the
greatest possible profits by retaining the stock for later dis-
posal? They knew from their experience that the biggest
Carrier v. Carrier, 226 N. Y. 114, 125, 123 N. E. 135, 138 (1919).
Guaranty Trust Company of New York v. United States Steel Corpora-
tion, 107 Misc. 720, 176 N. Y. Supp. 402 (1919) and cases cited.
Ibid.
:' Matter of Walker, N. Y. L. J., June 30, 1930.
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losses on stocks occurred from over-staying the market, and
that it is better to sell out too soon than too late."
Surrogate Slater's conclusion in the Clark case is the culmina-
tion of a series of warnings expressed in a few recent decisions
through the medium of dicta. To this effect is the Matter of Chan-
ning,27 wherein the Court said, in considering such a discretion as we
are here concerned with:
"It is well to reiterate the caution frequently expressed in
this court that even in the face of this authority, vigilance and
alert judgment will be always required and the surcharging of
losses upon the trustee in future accountings is not beyond the
range of possibilities in spite of said authority."
The logic of the principle enunciated in the Clark case is per-
suasive. That a discretion vested in a trustee should be allowed to
pervert our every concept of a trustee is repugnant to the connotation
of justice. In spite of any discretion or permission, the trust company
was still a trustee.28 As such, it was bound to exercise that degree of
care and fidelity which the law required.2 9 Its failure so to act makes
its surcharging a necessary corollary.
JOSEPH A. SCHIAVONE.
LARCENY GENERICALLY, AND TIE OFFICE OF A BILL OF
PARTICULARS IN RESPECT TO AN INDICTMENT.*
In a recent opinion handed down by the Court of Appeals, the
Court again had occasion to discuss the meaning of larceny by trick,
and obtaining property by false pretense.' If the opinion in this case
merely discussed the definition of these two crimes, then the subject
could well be disregarded for it has been amply covered in the past by
judicial opinion and controversial legal literature.2 The decision, how-
129 Misc. 393, 394, 222 N. Y. Supp. 351 (1927); see Matter of Frank,
124 Misc. 664, 208 N. Y. Supp. 254 (1925).
:' Carrier v. Carrier, supra Note 23.
King v. Talbot, Matter of Hall, Costello v. Costello, all supra Note 2.
* Reprint from (1927) 1 St. John's L. Rev. 176, which issue is out of
circulation.
'People v. Noblett. 244 N. Y. 355 (1927).
- Thus, in Hilderbrand v. People, 56 N. Y. 394 (1874), the prosecuting
witness handed the prisoner, who was a bartender in a saloon, a fifty-dollar
bill to take ten cents out in payment for a soda. It was held that it was an
incomplete transaction, to be consummated in the presence of and under the
personal control of the complainant. The delivery of the bill and the change
were to be simultaneous acts, and until the latter was performed, the delivery
was not complete. The rule thus enunciated was further extended in a later
case, Justices of Court of Special Sessions v. People. 90 N. Y. 12 (1882),
where the same conclusion was reached, when the prosecuting witness gave the
prisoner a twenty-dollar bill and requested him to go out and get it changed, on
